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NOTES
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS: REVITALIZING THE LEGACY OF
THE PAQUETE HABANA
I'm nothing but a trial judge in one federal court.... I don't
run the universe, and I have nothing to do with international
affairs.'
Consider the above quote from a federal district court judge in
light of the following: In the early 1990s, members of an Algeri-
an fundamentalist group brutally raped and tortured several
Algerian women in Algeria.2 In addition, the group butchered
and summarily executed friends and family members of the
women in Algeria.3 When the Algerian military government
banned the fundamentalist group, one of the group's members
fled to the United States, sought political asylum, and conducted
business on behalf of the group from Washington, D.C.4 The Al-
gerian women then brought suit against the group in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that
the actions taken against them, their friends, and their family
members in Algeria constituted violations of international law.5
1. Tracy Thompson, Hijacker Gets 30-Year Prison Term, WASH. POST, Oct. 5,
1989, at A39 (quoting the Honorable Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia).
2. The facts presented in this scenario are based on a recent case decided by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Doe v. Islamic Salvation
Front (FIS), 993 F. Supp. 3, 5-6 (D.D.C. 1998). For a discussion of Islamic Salvation
Front, see infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. For a detailed account of some
of the human rights atrocities that have taken place in Algeria recently, see Ben
Macintyre, Algerian Savagery Grows, TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 1998, at 10.
3. See Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. at 5.
4. See id. at 6.
5. See id. at 5.
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Despite the fact that the alleged events described above took
place in Algeria, concerned only Algerian citizens, and involved
a claim of a violation of international law, a United States dis-
trict court had jurisdiction over the case under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA).6 ATCA provides: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil [tort] action by an alien...
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."7 Rather than claiming a violation of a treaty to
which the United States was a party, the Algerian women based
their ATCA claim on a violation of the "law of nations."'
Ascertaining whether a violation of the "law of nations" has
occurred involves delving into the territory of "customary inter-
national law,"9 a growing body of law that includes norms that
emerge when "conduct, or the conscious abstention from certain
conduct, of states.., becomes in some measure a part of [the]
international legal order."" Determining the scope of customary
6. Although Congress passed ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), as part of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 over 200 years ago, it was rarely used until the recent surge of
interest and awareness in protecting human rights. See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID
WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 505 (1996)
("ATCA was not widely used until the 1980s, when a growing interest in protecting
human rights and an increase in the number of lawyers familiar with international
law heralded a resurgence in use of the statute."); see also Alan Frederick Enslen,
Commentary, Filartiga's Offspring: The Second Circuit Significantly Expands the
Scope of the Alien Tort Claim Act With its Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48 ALA. L.
REV. 695, 695 (1997) (noting that the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), "lifted the now more than 200-year-old Alien Tort
Claim Act (ATCA) from obscurity" (footnote omitted)); infra notes 82-88 and accom-
panying text (discussing Islamic Salvation Front).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
8. See Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. at 8.
9. Many experts agree that customary international law is considered part of the
"law of nations." See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 ("[W]e find that an act of tor-
ture committed by a state official against one held in detention violates established
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations.");
Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. at 7 ("The law of nations, [is] currently known
as international customary law ... ."); Joan Fitzpatrick et al., Enforcing Human
Rights in the United States, 19 WHITIER L. REV. 267, 268 (1997) (noting that
Filartiga stood for the proposition "that present-day norms of customary interna-
tional law, including human rights norms, are the law of nations to which the ATCA
refers").
10. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HumAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT. LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 28 (1996). For additional information on attempts to
define customary international law, see infra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.
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international law is often difficult. Although the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ("Re-
statement") and a few federal court cases" provide clarification
and reinforce the authority of customary international law in
U.S. courts, ambiguities remain. The Restatement itself ac-
knowledges some of this uncertainty: "No definition of customary
law has received universal agreement .... Each element in at-
tempted definitions has raised difficulties. There have been
philosophical debates about the very basis of the definition: how
can practice build law?"1
3
The ambiguities inherent in defining and using customary
international law have sparked heated debates regarding its
use, particularly in international human rights claims in domes-
tic courts.' 4 On one side of the debate are those who maintain
that U.S. courts have a responsibility to enforce and uphold in-
ternational law, and should continue to do so even when decid-
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 102, 702 (1987); see also infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (discussing the
Restatements treatment of customary international law). Although the Restatement
has no official legal status, judges considering international legal issues consult it
frequently for guidance. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 10, at 147. The Restate-
ment explicitly asserts that customary international law is U.S. law. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. c
("The customary law of human rights is part of the law of the United States to be
applied as such by State as well as federal courts.").
12. See infra text accompanying notes 56-92 (discussing cases in which courts
have upheld the use of customary international law).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102, reporters' note 2.
14. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) (arguing
that absent an express legislative direction, courts should not apply customary inter-
national law); James Crawford et al., Application of Customary International Law by
National Tribunals, 76 AM. SOO'Y OF INTL L. PROC. 231, 231-67 (1982) (discussing
the use of customary international law in English courts); Anthony D'Amato, Human
Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COmp. L. 47 (1995-96) (pointing to public sentiment as a reason for
change within international law and discussing jurisdictional issues); Harold H.
Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in the Federal Courts of
the United States, 26 AM. J. INVL L. 280 (1932) (discussing various theories as to
the sources of international law); Symposium, Customary International Human Rights
Law: Evolution, Status and Future, 25 GA. J. INTIL & COip. L. 47 (1995) (discussing
the importance, changes, problems, and future of customary international law of
human rights).
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ing a claim requires the courts to make difficult customary inter-
national law findings. 5 On the other side are critics who argue
that the ambiguities of customary international law are too
great, that U.S. courts lack the authority to "find" customary
international law, and that letting them do so offends federalism
and separation of powers principles. 6 For example, some critics
assert that customary international law is unenforceable in U.S.
courts without an explicit congressional authorization.' An in-
crease in the number of international human rights cases reach-
ing federal courts,' 8 and the recent trend toward loosening the
requirements of and decreasing the time necessary for establish-
ing customary norms,"9 have intensified the customary interna-
tional law debate and imposed urgency on the need to resolve it.
Almost a century ago, in The Paquete Habana, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that "[International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction."2 The Court, in The Paquete
15. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1564-67, 1569 (1984); Richard B. Lillich, The Proper Role of
Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INVL L. 9, 44-45 (1970);
Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law
After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 453-61 (1997).
16. See, e.g., Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Func-
tional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 575 (1966); Phillip R. Trinble, A Revisionist View
of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 708-09 (1986).
17. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815,
874 (1997) (questioning customary international law's accepted status).
18. See, e.g., id. (noting the "burgeoning number of international cases in U.S.
courts"); Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 9, at 267 ("The past two decades have wit-
nessed a remarkable flourishing of litigation in United States courts against individ-
ual perpetrators of human rights violations.").
19. See, e.g., KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (2d rev.
ed. 1993) ("At present . .. an international custom can arise even in a very short
time."); Paul C. Szasz, General Law-Making Processes, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2, 31 (Chris C. Joyner ed., 1997) (explaining that the speed by
which customary international law is created has increased substantially with the
"general acceleration of international interactions").
20. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
21. Id. at 700. The case involved the United States's capture and sale of two
Spanish fishing vessels off the coast of Cuba during the Spanish-American War. See
id. at 678-79. Although no treaty or other written international agreement specified
that ordinary fishing vessels were exempt from capture as a prize of war, the Court
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Habana, upheld the idea that U.S. courts should not ignore
cases with international law elements; rather, they should en-
gage in a legal analysis that incorporates recognition of interna-
tional law principles.22 The Paquete Habana also specifically
acknowledged the validity of customary international law by
further clarifying that international law could be binding even
when no treaty or legislation codified that law:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by
years of labor, research and experience, have made them-
selves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which
they treat.23
Since Justice Gray wrote the Court's opinion in The Paquete
Habana, major world events have expanded the scope of inter-
national law and increased the significance of its definition, in-
terpretation, and enforcement.2' As international law has grown
in importance in the United States, domestic judicial decisions
on international law issues, particularly those involving human
rights, have cited The Paquete Habana in support of the use of
customary international law as authority in U.S. courts.25 A
traced the practice of maintaining such an exception throughout history and found
that the United States had violated international law as established through custom.
See id. at 686-711. The Court determined that the capture of the vessels was unlaw-
ful and ordered the proceeds of the sale returned to the claimant with damages and
costs. See id. at 714.
22. See id. at 700.
23. Id.
24. Consider the following examples: the Versailles Treaty, ending World War I,
resulted in the development of the League of Nations and the International Labour
Organization; the International Tribunal at Nuremberg after World War II led to the
prosecution of war criminals; and the creation of the United Nations, also occurring
in the aftermath of World War H, established a world organization committed to
cooperative international peace and security efforts. See PETER MALANCZUK,
AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-32 (7th rev. ed.
1997). After it signed the U.N. Charter in 1945, the United States committed itself
to "establish[ing] conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations aris-
ing from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained." U.N.
CHARTER preamble, para. 3.
25. See, e.g., Hileo v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
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court's decision to find and adhere to a customary international
norm thus has important implications for the legacy of respect
for international law fostered by The Paquete Habana. Finding
and adhering to customary international norms reinforces the
legacy of The Paquete Habana and conveys the United States's
commitment to ensuring that it serves as a cooperative member
of an increasingly globalized world; refusing to find and adhere
to customary international norms unravels the legacy and sug-
gests a rebellion against international constraints.
This Note contends that U.S. courts should reinforce-not un-
ravel-The Paquete Habana's legacy by recognizing and uphold-
ing norms of customary international law in international hu-
man rights cases, in spite of the growing criticism of that prac-
tice. As this Note argues, the ambiguity inherent in the nature
of customary international law is not a justification for ignoring
the authority of customary international law. That ambiguity is
in fact quite similar to uncertainties in other areas of law in
which courts routinely make decisions. Foreclosing or severely
limiting the viability of international human rights claims based
on customary international law in U.S. courts not only elimi-
nates the possibility of relief for many injured plaintiffs, 6 it also
sends a disturbing message to the world community that justice
The Paquete Habana's phrase, "International law is part of our law"); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 787 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing The Paquete
Habana to support the proposition that the "law of nations" is an "integral part of
the laws of this country"); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1188 n.9 (D. Conn.
1980) (citing The Paquete Habana to support the proposition that "[it is well estab-
lished that customary international law is part of the law of the United States"),
affd in part and modified in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
26. Plaintiffs bringing ATCA claims in U.S. courts often have no other forum
available to them. Even if civil suits could be filed in the country in which the acts
took place,
[tihose suits may not ... adequately protect or compensate victims. For
instance, repressive governments may refuse to enforce or even permit
the legal actions. Also, when there is armed conflict, normal judicial pro-
cesses may be disrupted and judgments not enforced.... Another mech-
anism might be a case in the International Court of Justice. ICJ jurisdic-
tion, however, is limited to suits between governments and judgments are
not enforceable by individuals.
NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 6, at 500. If no treaty applies and the plaintiffs
are unable to rely on customary international law to get into a U.S. court, they may
be without a remedy.
1400
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
in the United States does not encompass challenges of interna-
tionally recognized abuses of human rights.27
The first section of this Note discusses attempts made to
define customary international law, including those in the Re-
statement. The second section discusses successful, albeit con-
troversial, uses of customary international law in ATCA claims
in U.S. courts, including the Second Circuit's decisions in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala28 and Kadic v. Karadzic,29 and the recent
federal district court decision in Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS).° The third section addresses some of the criticisms re-
garding the use of customary international law in U.S. courts
and discusses an unsuccessful attempt to use customary interna-
tional law, without ATCA, that is consistent with those criti-
cisms. The fourth section proposes reasons why, in spite of those
criticisms, U.S. courts should continue to reinforce the legacy of
respect for customary international law as the new century
approaches.
ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although a full discussion of the history of customary inter-
national law is beyond the scope of this Note, 31 some background
on past attempts to define and identify it is necessary. In The
Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court noted that ascertaining
customary international law entails "resort... to the customs
and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the
works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, re-
search and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well
27. A renowned human rights advocate has suggested that one reason why the
United States should provide a remedy for human rights victims is to "serve notice
to the world that the United States is committed to deal fairly and impartially-in
the courts-with cases having foreign policy implications." Kenneth Jost, Don't Say
Wo' to Human Rights, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 14 (referring to remarks made
by Professor Anthony D'Amato).
28. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
30. 993 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998).
31. For additional background information on customary international law, see M.
Erin Kelly, Comment, Customary International Law in United States Courts, 32
VILL. L. REV. 1089, 1090-1101 (1987).
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acquainted with the subjects of which they treat."32 These words
may not provide an explicit definition of what customary inter-
national law is, but they do provide a guide as to how to find it.
In accordance with the words of The Paquete Habana, courts
seeking to identify international legal norms have looked to ex-
perts in the field of international law for guidance on the extent
to which certain practices have become so widespread as to be
considered part of international law. These experts have been
instrumental in determining the status of various practices;
however, their role is not to steer the law in a specific direc-
tion.3' Rather, they work with existing definitions and examples
of practices that already have become customary international
law in making their assessments. 5
In their analysis, experts and judges may look to the Restate-
ment 6 The Restatement acknowledges that a precise definition
of customary international law remains elusive; 7 nevertheless it
attempts to provide a workable definition. In its section on
sources of international law, the Restatement describes custom-
ary international law as "result[ing] from a general and consis-
tent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation. 8 Clarification in the comments and reporters' notes
32. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
33. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 & n.4, 886 (identifying the opinions of
experts regarding the use of customary international law).
34. As stated in The Paquete Habana, the works of jurists and international law
experts "are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their au-
thors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the
law really is." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
35. Cf Harold G. Maier, The Role of Experts in Prouing International Human
Rights Law in Domestic Courts: A Commentary, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205,
211 (1995) (explaining that "scholarly opinions are not themselves authoritative
sources of customary international law but provide indirect evidence of the existence
and content of international legal norms"). Maier also points out that although ex-
perts testifying in cases involving customary international law may possess certain
advocate tendencies, situations in which experts testify in other areas of the law are
no different. See id. at 213.
36. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (alluding to the fact that several
courts considering customary international claims specifically cited to the Restatement
in their decisions).
37. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.




to section 102 indicates that the determination as to when a
practice actually becomes law through custom is "often diffi-
cult"3 9 and that today a practice can achieve customary interna-
tional law status in a short period of time.40
The Restatement's "Human Rights" section is more precise,
explicitly listing practices that have achieved the status of cus-
tomary international law. According to section 702:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state pol-
icy, it practices, encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.4'
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Comment (a) of section
702 offers a caveat: "The list is not necessarily complete, and is
not closed: human rights not listed in this section may have
achieved the status of customary law, and some rights might
achieve that status in the future."2 The comments also note that
39. Id. § 102 cmt. c ("A practice initially followed by states as a matter of courte-
sy or habit may become law when states generally come to believe that they are
under a legal obligation to comply with it. It is often difficult to determine when
that transformation into law has taken place.").
40. The comments provide:
Earlier definitions implied that establishment of custom required that the
practice of states continue over an extended period of time. That require-
ment began to lose its force after the Second World War, perhaps be-
cause improved communication made the practice of states widely and
quickly known, at least where there is broad acceptance and no or little
objection.
Id. at reporters' note 2; see also supra note 19 (discussing the rapidity by which
customary international law evolves).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702.
42. Id. § 702 cmt. a. The reporters' notes restate this caveat: "Other rights may
already have become customary law and international law may develop to include
additional rights. It has been argued that customary international law is already
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systematic religious discrimination, the right to own and not be
arbitrarily deprived of property, and gender discrimination were
either already principles of customary international law at the
time the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted the Restatement
in 1987, or were on the verge of achieving that status.43
According to the Restatement, therefore, a plaintiff seeking to
prove a violation of customary international law can offer evi-
dence that the practice at issue constitutes one of those stated in
(a) through (f) of section 702 of the Restatement, is part of a con-
sistent pattern of gross violations within section (g), or is not on
the list, but has achieved the status of customary law since the
ALI's adoption of the Restatement. A court then weighs the evi-
dence offered in support of the alleged violation to determine
whether customary international law should apply to the action
in question. 44
In Forti v. Suarez-Mason,45 a federal district court offered
three additional criteria for ascertaining whether an act or prac-
tice falls within the scope of ATCA as part of customary interna-
tional law. According to Forti, in order to establish a violation of
customary international law, the act or practice at issue has to
be "universal, definable, and obligatory."6 Several experts have
adopted these categories as a means of demonstrating whether a
customary international norm exists.47 Even with these criteria,
however, it remains difficult for courts to discern identifiable
norms of international law."
more comprehensive than here indicated and forbids violation of any of the rights
set forth in the Universal Declaration." Id. at reporters' note 1.
43. See id. § 702 cmts. j-1.
44. As mentioned earlier, although the Restatement has no official legal status,
judges do consult it for guidance on international legal issues. See supra note 11.
45. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
46. Id. at 1540.
47. See Affidavit of 'International Law Scholars at 23, Ortiz v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (No. 91-11612 WD), reprinted in BETH STEPHENS ET AL.,
SUING FOR TORTURE AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN FEDERAL COURT: A Lm-
GATION MANUAL app. 8 at 51A-64A (1993).
48. See Enslen, supra note 6, at 704-06 (discussing the difficulty of ascertaining
whether a norm has been violated when it is unclear whether the violation at issue
is "universal"); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (citing the Restate-




The fact that the list of customary norms constantly increases
only compounds the problem. One expert has noted that "devel-
opments affecting human rights in the past decade indicate that
the list of customary law rights may have significantly in-
creased."49 The right to basic sustenance; the right to public as-
sistance in matters of health, welfare, and basic education; and
the rights of women to full equality and protection against dis-
crimination have all gained such acceptance in international
legal thought that courts may begin to acknowledge them as
customary international law.5"
On the other hand, just because the list of customary interna-
tional norms *continues to grow and the standards remain some-
what ambiguous does not mean that every practice that appar-
ently violates international standards inevitably will become
part of customary international law. Despite numerous attempts
over the past few years to enlarge the list of customary interna-
tional norms binding on the United States,51 the list remains
quite small.52 For instance, courts have yet to find uniformly
that cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of an individual
violates customary international law.53 Similarly, courts have yet
to rule that the right to education and the right to free speech
are customary international law norms, despite strong argu-
ments for their inclusion.'
Perhaps the absence of a definitive explanation of what it
takes to establish a customary international law norm contrib-
utes to the fact that the list of customary international law
49. OsCAR SCHACTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 338 (1991).
50. See id. at 340.
51. For a list of practices proposed for inclusion in customary international law
during the past decade, see Stephens, supra note 15, at 455 n.307.
52. See id. at 455 (describing the current list of customary international law
norms as "extremely short").
53. See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 506-09 (1997).
54. See Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International
Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMOP. L. 1, 6 (1995) (citing Guinto v.
Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (discussing the right to free speech)
and In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 596 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd
sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (discussing the existence of a right to
education)).
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norms remains small. The various attempts to define customary
international law remain largely unsuccessful because this area
does not lend itself to static definition. Most experts and judges
agree that judges must assess whether a violation of the "law of
nations" has occurred according to current rather than past defi-
nitions of international law.55 The definition of what constitutes
a violation therefore will constantly evolve as individual interna-
tional practices gradually develop into customary international
law.
SUPPORTING THE LEGACY: SUCCESSFUL USES OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS
A brief illustration of successful uses of customary interna-
tional law in U.S. courts helps provide a logical context for the
above-mentioned attempts to define and identify customary in-
ternational law. At least two important cases from the Second
Circuit, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and Kadic v. Karadzic, and one
from the district court for the District of Columbia, Doe v. Islam-
ic Salvation Front, illustrate judicial acceptance of the authority
of customary international law in U.S. courts. In all three cases,
the court relied on the "law of nations" and on customary inter-
national law to hold that individuals bringing claims under
ATCA have a right to use U.S. courts to enforce norms of inter-
national law.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
In Filartiga, a father and daughter from Paraguay brought a
suit under ATCA 56 against a fellow Paraguayan for acts of tor-
ture committed in Paraguay against a member of their family.5"
The father and daughter alleged that a member of the Para-
guayan police violated international law by kidnapping Joelito
Filartiga, a local physician, and torturing him to death because
of his father's opposition to the Paraguayan government.58 They
55. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 47, at 35-36.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
57. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
58. See id. The court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant because he was
1406
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based their claim on a violation of the "law of nations" rather
than on any action arising directly under a treaty.59 The court
relied on the U.N. Charter6° and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights6 in holding that official torture "violates estab-
lished norms of the international law of human rights, and
hence the law of nations."62 The court cited The Paquete Habana
as well as the U.N. Charter to support the proposition that "in
this modern age a state's treatment of its own citizens is a mat-
ter of international concern."63 Filartiga also reaffirmed the ex-
istence of a binding international law that confers rights on indi-
viduals,6 and referenced U.S. foreign policy prohibiting security
assistance to countries that violate human rights as support for
the notion that the United States abides by international law on
human rights issues. 5
served with a summons and civil complaint while in the United States. See id. at
879.
59. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
60. The U.N. Charter commits signatories, of which the United States is one, to
"achiev[ing] international co-operation in solving international problems of an eco-
nomic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 3. International hu-
man rights issues took on global importance through the implementation of the U.N.
Charter and the U.N. General Assembly's subsequent adoption of the Universal Dec-
laration on Human Rights. See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INTL &
COMP. L. 287, 290-91 (1995).
61. G.A Res. 217 III(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
62. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
63. Id. at 881 (citing U.N. CHARTER; The Paquete Habana, 1875 U.S. 677, 700
(1900)). The relevant portions of the U.N. Charter provide:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among na-
tions ... the United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion. All Members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Or-
ganization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56.
64. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884-85 ("The treaties and accords cited above as
well as the express foreign policy of our own government, all make it clear that in-
ternational law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own gov-
ernments." (footnote omitted)).
65. See id. at 885 n.17.
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The Filartiga decision helped verify the credibility of custom-
ary international law and the ability of U.S. courts to recognize
and enforce such law.66 The Second Circuit noted that even the
district court, which had dismissed the case on jurisdictional
grounds, had "recognized the strength of appellants' argument
that official torture violates an emerging norm of customary in-
ternational law." 7
Kadic v. Karadzic
In Kadic, Croat and Muslim victims of crimes committed in
Bosnia sued the President of the unrecognized Bosnian-Serb
State for rape, forced prostitution, torture, summary execution,
genocide, and other atrocities.6 8 As in Filartiga, the plaintiffs
based their suit on a violation of the "law of nations," under
ATCA, rather than on any action arising under a treaty.6 9 Al-
though the district court had found that it did not have jurisdic-
tion under ATCA to review acts of torture allegedly committed
by private actors,70 the Second Circuit panel reviewing the deci-
sion disagreed. Chief Judge Newman acknowledged at the outset
of the Second Circuit's opinion that "[miost Americans would
probably be surprised to learn that victims of atrocities commit-
ted in Bosnia are suing the leader of the insurgent Bosnian-Serb
forces in a United States District Court in Manhattan,"71 yet the
court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged violations of
customary international law for purposes of ATCA, and held
that a U.S. court could hold Karadzic liable for the violations.72
66. For discussions on the impact of the Filartiga decision, see NEWMAN &
WEISSBRODT, supra note 6, at 505, 509 ("The Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala ... paved the way for many subsequent suits to compensate victims for
violations of international law."); Peter Schuyler Black, Recent Development, Kadic v.
Karadzic: Misinterpreting the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 GA. L. REV. 281 (1996) (ex-
plaining that both courts and litigants struggle with the ATCA's ambiguities);
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 831-34.
67. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
68. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995).
69. See id. at 241.
70. See Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).




Kadic reiterated the validity of using customary international
law to establish jurisdiction to litigate international human
rights cases in U.S. courts.7 3 The decision, viewed as an expan-
sion of Filartiga,4 relied heavily on that case and the idea that
the "law of nations" and customary international law provide
jurisdiction for a cause of action in U.S. courts.7 5 Karadzic had
argued that ATCA, like the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 (TVPA),6 requires a "state actor," but the court rejected his
argument." Instead, the court declared:
We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the
modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we
hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a
state or only as private individuals.8
The court also noted Congress's desire to sustain a separate
cause of action that would "permit suits based on other norms
[not specified in the TVPA] that... may ripen in the future into
rules of customary international law." 9 Finally, the court cau-
tioned against judicial retreat from disputes that have foreign
policy implications, quoting from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Baker v. Carr" that "it is 'error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance."''
73. See id. at 239-40.
74. See Enslen, supra note 6, at 722-23 ("The Kadic opinion is not merely a small
step forward from Filartiga. Rather, it may properly be viewed as a giant leap for
both the rights of individual aliens and the plight of international human rights
advocates.").
75. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). TVPA codified the Filartiga holding. See NEWMhAN &
WEISSBRODT, supra note 6, at 550. It provides a cause of action for specific torture
crimes similar to the cause of action provided by ATCA, but it differs from ATCA in
that it provides the cause of action to both U.S. citizens and aliens, and it actually
eliminates the need for a court to find a customary international norm because it
specifies a cause of action for certain identified actions. See id. at 551.
77. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 241 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86).
80. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
81. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
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Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
Islamic Salvation Front, the case described briefly at the be-
ginning of this Note, involved eight anonymous Algerian and
French women suing a high-ranking official in the Algerian Is-
lamic Salvation Front. 2 Like the plaintiffs in Filartiga and
Kadic, the women in Islamic Salvation Front based their claim
on ATCA, alleging that the defendant violated customary inter-
national law-and thus the "law of nations"--by participating in
crimes such as summary execution, rape, mutilation, sexual
slavery, and murder." At the outset, the district court declined
to follow a prior fragmented D.C. Circuit decision, Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic,84 which had found that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over Israeli citizens who had claimed
relief under ATCA for acts of torture committed against them by
armed members of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO)." Instead, in Islamic Salvation Front, the court adhered
to the reasoning set forth in Kadic. Judge Sporkin stated: "The
decision in [Kadic v.] Karadzic came after this Circuit's opinions
in Tel-Oren.... Because of the clarity of the Second Circuit's
decision and because the facts there are similar to those in the
instant case, this Court finds that it is the appropriate precedent
to apply in this case."86 Discussing the validity of the customary
international law claims at issue, the court restated the same
ATCA legislative history cited in Kadic that left open the possi-
bility of ATCA being used to find remedies for undefined cus-
tomary norms.87 The court then denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss, reiterating that U.S. courts could hold private actors
responsible for claims under ATCA and that the alleged acts of
the defendant violated international law.88
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211)).
82. See Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 3, 5 (D.D.C. 1998).
83. See id. at 5, 7.
84. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
85. See Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. at 8 (citing Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
775).
86. Id. at 8.
87. See id. at 7 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86); see also supra text accompanying note 79 (quoting Kadic's un-
derstanding of ATCA legislative history).




Filartiga, Kadic, and Islamic Salvation Front embraced the
legacy of The Paquete Habana by supporting the validity of
international human rights claims in U.S. courts based on cus-
tomary international law. These decisions make clear that the
United States has codified the "international law is our law"
concept through ATCA, legislation that facilitates U.S. court res-
olution of claims with international elements.8 9 The legacy of
respect for international law obtains further potency from the
Restatement, cited in Islamic Salvation Front,° Kadic,9' and
Filartiga.92
Although such evidence suggests that the legacy of support for
the use of customary international law in U.S. courts is strong,
counterevidence demonstrates a solid and growing resistance to
the idea that "international law is our law." This
counterevidence, which includes specific criticism of Filartiga
and Kadic, general criticism of judicial encroachments into in-
ternational law, a notable rejection of customary international
law by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, and overall questions about the sincerity of the United
States's commitment to human rights issues, exposes several
weaknesses in The Paquete Habana's legacy.
UNRAVELING THE LEGACY: UNDERCURRENTS OF RESISTANCE TO
USE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw IN U.S. COURTS
Criticism of Filartiga, Kadic, and Judicial Encroachment into
International Law
Critics of the use of customary international law in U.S.
courts have attacked the Filartiga and Kadic decisions for their
flawed reasoning 3 and "inappropriate leniency in allowing U.S.
89. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
90. See Islamic Slavation Front, 993 F. Supp. at 9.
91. See Kadic v. Karadzik, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995).
92. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (utilizing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987)).
93. For a critique of the reasoning used in Filartiga, see Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 17, at 834. Bradley & Goldsmith state:
[T]he [Filartiga] court relied uncritically on pre-Erie precedents applying
[customary international law]. The court appeared not to understand that
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courts jurisdiction over international human rights cases. 94
Some fault Kadic for broadening the scope of viable claims un-
der ATCA, thereby "increas[ing] the number of potential defen-
dants and consequently the amount of litigation pertaining to in-
ternational human rights cases."95 One complaint is that, in an
already crowded judicial system, a flood of international human
rights cases based on unidentified customary norms, to be decid-
ed by judges lacking expertise in international law,96 poses in-
herent dangers.97 Presumably, without clarity on how to assess
the validity of customary international law claims adequately,
stability and predictability of judicial review evaporate, injecting
confusion into courtrooms and fostering arbitrary decisionmak-
ing. 8 To avoid this problem, critics have called for a more nar-
row construction of ATCA.99 These critics argue that courts have
interpreted the legislation facilitating international claims in
U.S. courts too broadly.' 0
Chief Justice Fuller's dissent in The Paquete Habana provides
ammunition for these critics as well as for those who remain
generally opposed to the use of customary international law in
U.S. courts:
these precedents applied [customary international law] as general com-
mon law, not federal law.... [Ilt failed to contemplate the significance
of Erie for the legal status of (customary international law] .... Finally,
the court failed to consider the numerous and potentially profound collat-
eral consequences that follow from the view that [customary international
law] is federal common law.
Id. (citation omitted).
94. Black, supra note 66, at 281.
95. Enslen, supra note 6, at 728.
96. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1617, 1668 (1997) (observing that "[jiudges generally lack foreign relations
information and expertise").
97. See Enslen, supra note 6, at 728-29 (discussing the possibility that such cases
will burden the United States judicial system).
98. Cf. Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789: Lessons
from In Re Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 491, 494 (1993)
(discussing the basis for challenges to domestic judicial determination of internation-
al human rights cases).
99. See Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations,
18 HASTINGS INTL & CoMP. L. REv. 445, 446-47, 453-78 (1995) (arguing that Con-
gress intended ATCA to cover only wrongs committed in violation of the law of prize




I am unable to conclude that there is any such established
international rule, or that this court can properly revise ac-
tion which must be treated as having been taken in the ordi-
nary exercise of discretion in the conduct of war. It cannot be
maintained "that modern usage constitutes a rule which acts
directly upon the thing itself by its own force, and not
through the sovereign power."''
Many arguments of those opposing the use of customary inter-
national law hinge on what Chief Justice Fuller alluded to-the
lack of express domestic authorization for enforcing such law."°2
Critics also can point to a lack of legislation on international
human rights issues and ambiguities in the Restatement °" that
make it challenging for the judiciary to rule on the authority of
international human rights law in the United States. In addi-
tion, critics can highlight the fact that courts in other countries,
such as Canada and Great Britain, almost never allow custom-
ary international law to be used in human rights litigation in
their courts,' ° indicating that the United States should refrain
from doing so as well.
The Eleventh Circuit's Decision in Garcia-Mir v. Meese
In Garcia-Mir v. Meese,1" 5 decided between the Second Cir-
cuit's Filartiga and Kadic decisions, the Eleventh' Circuit issued
an opinion consistent with some of the prevalent criticisms of
101. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 715 (1900) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
102. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 817-21, 870-73. Bradley &
Goldsmith acknowledge, however, that under "the prevailing view . . . no congressio-
nal authorization is necessary in order for courts to apply [customary international
law] as federal law; indeed, courts are bound to do so even in the absence of such
authorization." Id. at "820 (citations omitted). They assert that the "prevailing view"
is based upon flawed assumptions and conclude that "the notion that federal courts
may apply any law, including [customary international law], without domestic autho-
rization cannot survive Erie." Id. at 857.
103. See supra notes 13, 39 and accompanying text.
104. See Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in
United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 33-34
(1992) (assessing the use of customary international law in Canada and Great Brit-
ain and concluding that "it is virtually impossible to identify any instances in which
customary international law has played a determinant, or even mildly significant,
role in human rights litigation [in those countries]").
105. 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986).
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the use of customary international law in U.S. courts. °6 Garcia-
Mir, which did not include a claim under ATCA, presented the
Eleventh Circuit with a customary international law challenge
different from the one faced by the Second Circuit in Filartiga
and Kadic and the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia in Islamic Salvation Front. Garcia-Mir involved an
appeal of several consolidated cases brought by Cubans who fled
to the United States in the Mariel boat lift. °  One of the charges
was that U.S. officials had violated what amounted to a custom-
ary international norm against prolonged arbitrary detention." 8
In response to a huge insurge in Cuban refugees, U.S. authori-
ties detained the Cubans in federal penitentiaries because U.S.
immigration law rendered them "excludable" and therefore re-
movable,0 9 but no other country had agreed to admit them."'
Domestic law failed to protect them because "excludable" aliens
have no legal rights in the United States; therefore, the Cubans
sought to prove that their indefinite detention in U.S. prisons
constituted a violation of international human rights law."'
Other federal district court decisions involving Cuban refugees
had intimated that a customary international prohibition on ar-
bitrary detention existed, and that the United States had violat-
ed it through its actions against the Cubans. In Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith,"2 for example, a federal district court stated in
dictum that "the various international law principles proscribing
prolonged, arbitrary detention of persons are binding on this
country and require the same sort of procedural safeguards as
the Court has determined below are mandated by the Constitu-
tion of the United States."" The district court cited the Univer-
106. See id. at 1453-55.
107. See id. at 1448.
108. See id. at 1453; see also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 791-92 (D.
Kan. 1980) (adjudicating the claims of Cuban refugees detained by the United States
government as an earlier phase of the case), affd on other grounds sub nom. Rodri-
guez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
109. See Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1453.
110. See id. at 1447-48
111. See id.
112. 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
113. Id. at 1122 n.2.
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sal Declaration of Human Rights,'14 the American Convention on
Human Rights," 5 the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights,1 6 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees" 7 for support.1
8
Garcia-Mir rejected these prior indications of support for a
decision based on customary international law, producing in-
stead a decision that reflected many of the concerns expressed
by critics of customary international law. Although the court did
not explicitly deny the existence of an international norm
against arbitrary detention, it ultimately found that such a
norm was not legally binding in a U.S. court because a "control-
ling executive or legislative act" on the issue had the power to
render the norm nonbinding in the United States." 9 The court
found that the requisite "controlling executive act" existed be-
cause the Attorney General had acted contrary to the norm
against arbitrary detention in deciding to incarcerate the Cu-
bans indefinitely, pending deportation, and that his action as an
executive branch official was sufficient to permit departure from
the norm."o The Eleventh Circuit added that even if the Attor-
ney General's actions were not sufficient, a controlling judicial
decision, such as the one in Jean v. Nelson,'2 ' which held that
"even an indefinitely incarcerated alien 'could not challenge his
continued detention without a hearing,'" "'22 would render the
norm nonbinding."
114. G.A. Res. 217 III(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
115. Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4, para. 5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, 146, 9 I.L.M. 673, 676 (en-
tered into force July 18, 1978).
116. Opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976).
117. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4,
1967).
118. The court did not, however, discuss these sources' authority over the court or
their impact on the decision. See Fernandez-Rogue v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 n.10
(11th Cir. 1984).
119. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
120. See id. at 1454-55.
121. 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), affd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
122. Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455 (quoting Jean, 727 F.2d at 974-75)
123. See id. at 1453-55.
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The Garcia-Mir court thus carefully avoided an outright dis-
avowal of customary international law while still providing cus-
tomary international law critics with precedent for their argu-
ments. The decision advised a narrow interpretation of the scope
of international law claims supported by The Paquete Habana
and, in so doing, upheld the view espoused by many critics that
the judiciary should refrain from basing decisions on interna-
tional standards.'2 In addition, Garcia-Mir signaled a new
warning for plaintiffs of the potential difficulties they could face
in attempting to enforce customary international law against
U.S. officials.
Doubts About the Sincerity of the United States Commitment to
Human Rights Issues
United States foreign policy provides a more general example
of resistance to the legacy of The Paquete Habana. Ultimately,
the legacy of The Paquete Habana centers on a respect for inter-
national law and a recognition that the United States should
adhere to and protect the integrity of international law. To some
extent, such respect is evident in the United States. Federal
courts have been willing to hear cases based on international
law even when none of the events giving rise to a case occurred
in the United States.125 Paying credence to international law in
U.S. courts, moreover, Congress has codified international law
principles in legislation, including ATCA. This express support
manifests the United States's appreciation of the relevance of in-
ternational law. In addition, the United States's willingness to
become a party to several human rights treaties further vali-
dates the authority of international human rights law in U.S.
courts. Among the human rights treaties to which the United
States is a party are the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refi-
gees,16 the Convention on the Political Rights of Women," the
124. See id. at 1454.
125. See supra notes 56-88 and accompanying text.
126. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4,
1967).
127. Opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered
into force July 7, 1954, and for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968).
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide," the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 9 and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination.
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Respect for international law is not, however, as entrenched
in the United States as it might seem. Although efforts in the
United States do convey some support for enforcement of inter-
national rights through the making of treaty law, a closer look
at U.S. treaty policy indicates that the United States's commit-
ment to human rights issues is less than firm.13 ' Although the
United States has provided full support for a handful of human
rights treaties, 1 2 more often it has imposed reservations to those
treaties,' 3 failed to ratify them for several years, if at all,"3 or
refrained from signing them entirely. 35
128. Opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered
into force Jan. 12, 1951, and for the U.S. July 7, 1976).
129. Opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 23
I.L.M. 1027 (entered into force June 26, 1987, and for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989).
130. Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered
into force Jan. 4, 1969, and for the U.S. Nov. 20, 1994).
131. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 10, at 750 ("One might say that the U.S.
has a lesser commitment to and concern with developing international human rights
than do many (say, European and Commonwealth) states of a roughly similar politi-
cal and economic character.").
132. Cf. NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE
143-45 (1990) (discussing the signing and ratifying of the Supplementary Slavery
Convention and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women).
133. See id. at 148-74 (discussing the United States's habitual practice of imposing
reservations to treaties).
134. Treaties do not become truly effective until the parties ratify the agreement.
The United States often signs treaties and then fails to ratify them for long period
of time. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. The following treaties are
examples of treaties that the United States has signed but not ratified: Convention
on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (en-
tered into force Sept. 2, 1990); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19
I.L.M. 33 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981); American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978);
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976). See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, International Human Rights Law in United States
Courts: Professor Riesenfeld's Contributions, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 601,
604 n.20 (1997).
135. Examples of treaties the United States has failed to sign include: Inter-Ameri-
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Critics of the use of customary international law in U.S.
courts can point to weaknesses in the United States's commit-
ment to international treaties, particularly in the field of human
rights law, to bolster the argument that courts have no business
dictating policy that conflicts with executive branch foreign poli-
cy decisions.' 36 The theory is that if the President wanted to
have the principles reflected in the treaties incorporated into
U.S. law, he would sign and submit the treaties to the Senate
for ratification. 37 Likewise, if the Senate wanted to incorporate
the treaties into U.S. law, it would sign and ratify them.3 " One
therefore might view the United States's failure to sign and rat-
ify treaties as signifying that the principles espoused in the un-
signed, unratified treaties are not meant to be incorporated into
U.S. law. Furthermore, courts should not be free to make and
apply those treaties that have been implicitly rejected by the
other branches of government.
Summary
Although the resistance to using international law as author-
ity in U.S. courts remains a mere undercurrent at the mo-
ment,3 9 it does serve to shake the foundation of the underlying
can Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against
Women, opened for signature June 9, 1994, 27 U.S.T. 3301 (entered into force Mar.
5, 1995) (26 States parties); Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, GJA.
Res. 44/128, Annex, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (en-
tered into force July 11, 1991) (29 States parties); Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 59, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) (87 States parties); Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force
Apr. 22, 1954) (127 States parties). See NEWMAN & WEISBRODT, supra note 6, at 39.
136. See, e.g., BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER
775 (2d ed. 1990) ("What about the possibility of the judiciary embarrassing the ex-
ecutive branch in 'cases having foreign policy implications'?").
137. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorpora-
tion of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2268-72 (1998); cf Goldsmith,
supra note 96, at 1665 (arguing that there is virtually no need for judicial interven-
tion in foreign affairs because of the President's authority in that area, and that
such intervention fosters likelihood of judicial error).
138. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 137, at 2268-72.
139. That customary international law is binding authority in United States courts
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principle that U.S. courts are bound by international law. As the
resistance gains exposure, courts may begin to question the con-
tinued viability of that underlying principle. With the growing
prevalence of international human rights cases in U.S. courts,'
the possible effects of the undercurrents become more conse-
quential, and the threat to the legacy of The Paquete Habana
becomes more real.
THE FUTURE OF THE LEGACY
In spite of the growing criticism of the use of customary inter-
national law in domestic litigation, several factors demonstrate
that a significant narrowing, or an express prohibition on its use
in U.S. courts, is neither immediately inevitable nor advisable.
First, paralleling the recent strong movement to prohibit or nar-
row use of customary international law in human rights litiga-
tion is an equally powerful movement to protect it. Academic
criticism of domestic use of customary international law, al-
though prevalent, has been met with persuasive, frequent rebut-
tals by those who support its use.' These rebuttals-by some of
the country's most notable international law scholars-refute the
critics' arguments and resoundingly declare the continued legiti-
macy and importance of customary international law in domestic
courts.
Harold Hongju Koh notes, for example, that the criticism of
customary international law "may have superficial appeal for
remains the current "prevailing view." See supra note 102; see also Gordon A.
Christenson, Customary International Human Rights Law in Domestic Court Deci-
sions, 25 GA. J. ITL & COMP. L. 225, 225 (1995) ("Traditional customary interna-
tional law, however, continues to be accepted without express incorporation unless
directed otherwise by the political branches."); Henkin, supra note 15, at 1557
("[Firom our national beginnings both state and federal courts have treated custom-
ary international law as incorporated and have applied it to cases before them with-
out express constitutional or legislative sanction.").
140. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 53; Harold Hongju Koh, Is Interna-
tional Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1827 (1998); Gerald L.
Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens,
The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law As Federal Law After Erie, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997).
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those not well steeped in the fields of international and foreign
affairs law" and that the critics' "anti-judicial-activism rhetoric
makes for lively and provocative reading .... But even casual
reflection compels the conclusion that [those critics] are utterly
mistaken."'42 Koh also notes that "[the Framers never suggest-
ed... that the federal courts' power to construe customary in-
ternational law should be somehow subordinated to the concur-
rent authority of the political branches to define the law of na-
tions."' Similarly, Gerald Neuman points out inherent flaws in
critiques of customary international law, such as the critique
offered by Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith,'4 and demon-
strates that judicial application of customary international law
is thoroughly consistent with "the American understanding of
democracy."'45 Furthermore, although the federalism and sepa-
ration of powers arguments against the use of customary inter-
national law are provocative, experts have consistently dis-
credited those arguments and explained that customary interna-
tional law remains compatible with constitutional principles.' 1
Rebuttals such as these, combined with the recent legislative
history on TVPA, which specifically preserves the use of cus-
tomary international law in U.S. courts for norms not individu-
ally listed in that Act, 47 suggest that the legacy of support for
customary international law remains strong.
Second, although the critics may be correct in noting that sig-
nificant ambiguities remain in the area of customary interna-
tional law, those ambiguities do not necessarily defeat the effec-
tiveness and value of using customary international law in in-
ternational human rights litigation in U.S. courts. Understand-
ably, the argument that customary international law contains
142. Koh, supra note 141, at 1827.
143. Id. at 1825 n.7.
144. See Neuman, supra note 141, at 371-83.
145. Id. at 383-88.
146. See Henkin, supra note 15, at 1559-60. For a persuasive, thorough argument
as to why the use of customary international law is consistent with the American
legal system, see Stephens, supra note 141, at 408-61.
147. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86
(noting that suits based on norms not specified in TVPA that "may ripen in the fu-
ture into rules of customary international law" remain permissible); see also supra
note 79 and accompanying text (quoting the legislative history of ATCA).
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great ambiguities could lead to a call for clarity and guidance
from the Restatement, or perhaps from some sort of legislation.
From a purely practical perspective, further clarity and guidance
on customary international law issues could prove useful for
plaintiffs, defendants, lawyers, and judges. From a theoretical
perspective, clarification might help codify emerging customary
international law trends and reaffirm the enforceability of cus-
tomary norms in federal courts.
A call for precise clarity and guidance regarding customary in-
ternational law, however, probably would not be successful and
might even be destructive. Customary international law is by its
very nature indefinable; it is law that treaties or legislation do
not clearly define.14 8 Putting forth a very specific definition with
firm guidelines for discerning customary norms is not only inad-
visable because it inevitably would be underinclusive; it also is
impossible due to the continually evolving nature of internation-
al law. Furthermore, ambiguities are prevalent throughout
many other areas of law. As one international law scholar ex-
plained:
There are, of course, uncertainties and ambiguities in inter-
national law, but questions about state practice and commu-
nity norms are not necessarily more difficult to answer than,
for example, questions about due process, equal protection
and legislative intent. In purely domestic cases, novel and
highly complex technical issues are regularly and successfully
addressed. Few international matters are more formidable.149
Indeed, part of the judiciary's job is to wade through those am-
biguities to make difficult determinations.
The related argument that judges lack the expertise required
to make informed decisions regarding international law5 is sim-
ply without merit. If ignorance of the law is no excuse for those
148. See Neuman, supra note 141, at 376 ("The doctrine [of customary international
law] enables the federal courts to fill the gap left when Congress has not specified
the domestic legal stance toward an international obligation of the United States or
of a foreign state.").
149. Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
805, 809 (1989).
150. See Goldsmith, supra note 96, at 1668.
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required to obey the law, it should not be an excuse for those re-
quired to decide the law. Judges routinely rule on issues on
which they lack expertise. 5' Instead of succumbing to the view
that international law is outside the realm of the judiciary and
foreclosing to plaintiffs the right to judicial redress, "[tihe chal-
lenge now is to educate both domestic advocates and judges as to
the usefulness and applicability of an increasing body of law, so
that judges routinely consider international law-based argu-
ments with the same ease they consider constitutional or statu-
tory ones." 52
Third, although it might be true that some other countries do
not grant customary international law significant authority in
their domestic courts, 5 ' it is extremely plausible that because
these countries tend to ratify human rights treaties more often
than the United States, they consequently do not need to rely on
customary international law." In addition, some other countries
do actually demonstrate respect for customary international law
in their domestic courts. For example, both German and Austri-
an courts recognize customary international law and allow it to
take precedence over domestic law even if the domestic law is
more recent than the customary international law at issue.1
5
151. See Charney, supra note 149, at 809. Charney explains:
The role of the judiciary in these cases does not differ from that played
in other cases it routinely decides. The courts are provided with the nec-
essary information by attorneys acting in their roles as advocates. True,
individual judges may not hear many international cases, but the judicia-
ry as a whole has done so often. Judges may thus rely upon their per-
sonal experience, augmented by resort to prior decisions of other judges,
scholarly writings, codifications of the law and the opinions of experts.
Id.
152. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 134, at 601. Groups occasionally sponsor voluntary
seminars for judges on various topics. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Issues Groups Fund
Seminars for Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at Al. Perhaps holding such semi-
nars on the broad topic of international law and, more specifically, customary inter-
national law would yield substantial benefits for the judicial system as customary
international law claims continue to appear in U.S. courts.
153. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (mentioning that Canada and Great
Britain almost never use customary international law in their courts).
154. See Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 104, at 38.
155. See Henkin, supra note 15, at 1565 n.34; see also Hannum, supra note 60, at
294, 347 (discussing German cases applying customary international law); Lillich,
supra note 15, at 17-18 & n.89 (discussing use of customary international law in
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Given the United States's questionable record with human
rights treaties, 156 enforcement of customary international law in
U.S. courts is essential to the United States's ability to maintain
an international reputation as a strong supporter of individual
liberties and a champion of human rights.57 Allowing the judi-
ciary to rule on human rights claims would not sanction broad
judicial activism; rather, it would ensure that the judiciary car-
ries out duties for which it shares responsibility.
[I]t is submitted that courts cannot be oblivious to the conse-
quences of judicial decisions that ignore international human
rights, and, by inaction or restrictive statutory interpretation,
tolerate or permit their violation. In the application of consti-
tutional guarantees and in the interpretation of laws that
affect human rights, the Supreme Court in particular can
neither restrict nor abandon its special constitutional role as
the protector of fundamental human rights. In the words of
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his last dissenting opinion be-
fore retiring from the Court, the Supreme Court ought not
"squander the authority and the legitimacy of this Court as a
protector of the powerless."'
Finally, perhaps critics can take solace in recognizing that
there actually may be little harm in allowing the enforcement of
customary international law in U.S. courts. If a court upholds a
norm that the legislature finds invalid, a controlling executive or
legislative act can subsequently render the norm nonbinding.5 9
German and Austrian courts).
156. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying% text.
157. According to some, that reputation has already grown weak. See Peter J.
Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 567
(1997). Spiro writes:
After several decades in which we could (perhaps with some justification)
hold our domestic practice out as the measure against which to judge
respect for human rights in other nations, we no longer can claim leader-
ship in this realm. The United States has violated international human
rights, on both an episodic and systemic basis.
Id.
158. Edward D. Re, Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights, 27 AKRON
L. REV. 281, 287-88 (1994) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2625
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
159. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Congress has a history of responding
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The damage done would be minimal. Critics' concerns about the
enforcement of norms against U.S. authorities, and the resulting
separation of powers anxieties that enforcement might engender,
likely are without basis, as the Garcia-Mir case demonstrated. 6 °
Locating a controlling executive or legislative act to render the
norm nonbinding probably would present little difficulty, given
the broad reading the court in Garcia-Mir gave to a "controlling
act."' 6' The ambiguity surrounding customary international law
thus cuts both ways; it not only enables plaintiffs to assert
claims that might otherwise be nonjusticiable, it also allows
courts the room to moderate the ultimate impact of those claims.
In short, although enforcement of customary international law
in human rights litigation in U.S. courts is currently under at-
tack from critics, the legacy of respect for customary internation-
al law fostered by The Paquete Habana remains defensible. Use
of customary international law does force the judiciary to make
difficult decisions, but, in spite of the quote at the beginning of
this Note, 162 "courts cannot isolate themselves from the great
moral issues of the day" and "cannot risk the fate of becoming
irrelevant in their crucial role of applying the law as an instru-
ment of justice."63 Even more fundamentally, in making his
statement about the inapplicability of any type of foreign affairs
to his role as judge, Judge Robinson apparently overlooked the
oft-quoted maxim from Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr: "[It is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."'
swiftly in order to express its disapproval of judicial action it finds unacceptable. For
example, through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress expressly overruled the
Supreme Court's decision in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989),
which had allocated the burdens of proof in disparate impact employment discrimi-
nation cases in a way that proved extremely difficult for plaintiffs to meet. See Ste-
phen L. Hayford & Michael J. Evers, The Interaction Between the Employment-At-
Will Doctrine and Employer-Employee Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Fair Em-
ployment Practices Claims: Difficult Choices for At-Will Employers, 73 N.C. L. REV.
443, 463 n.99 (1995).
160. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986).
161. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
162. See supra text accompanying note 1.
163. Edward D. Re, Human Rights, Domestic Courts, and Effective Remedies, 67 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 581, 591-92 (1993).




The approaching 100-year anniversary of The Paquete Habana
sets the stage for a clarification of the United States's commit-
ment to the principle that "[ilnternational law is part of our
law."165 Clarification becomes imperative with the growing num-
ber of United States courts hearing international law claims
stemming from both treaties and customary international law
norms. Much evidence supports the strength of The Paquete
Habana's legacy, but resistance to the legacy increases as the
reach of international law continues to expand. Harnessing that
reach and retreating to an isolationist view that shelters courts
from making decisions based on customary international law is
an unsettling solution, one that would send the United States
tumbling backwards into the past as a new century begins. On
the other hand, embracing The Paquete Habana's legacy and
reiterating the authority of federal courts to rule on claims
based on customary international law would enable courts to
carry out their responsibility for protecting the powerless, sal-
vage the United States's reputation for fostering individual lib-
erty, demonstrate an eagerness to participate in global account-
ability, and move the country confidently into the future.
Kathleen M. Kedian
165. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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